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2Non Technical Summary
The British government’s “New Deal” for young people has been up and
running nation-wide since April 1998. But is it working? And what will be
the long-term e¤ect on the UK labour market? In this paper we consider
the likely e¤ects of the initiative, focusing on the wage subsidy element (em-
ployers who take on an unemployed young person are o¤ered a £60 a week
subsidy for 6 months plus a £750 training subsidy). The wage subsidy ap-
pears generous when one considers what the likely earnings are of a typical
New Dealer (40-50% of their weekly earnings).
We examine the problem of evaluating the New Deal from several per-
spectives. It is too early to thoroughly analyse the outcomes for the New
Dealers currently going through the program, so we lay down some of the
key methodological issues. An ex ante approach speci…es explicit models of
the labour market and uses pre- New Deal data to calibrate the key parame-
ters of the model. Alternatively, an ex post approach estimates programme
impact using data before and after individuals pass through the programme.
A key problem for the ex post approach is the absence of any obvious control
group. We propose a “trend adjusted di¤erence in di¤erence” (DADID) es-
timator. This compares outcomes before and after programme participation
for New Dealers matched to similar individuals relative to an older group
and relative to a similar point of the business cycle.
Although this estimator can in principle deal with the problems of com-
mon trends and compositional change, it may fail to pick up general equilib-
rium e¤ects. Static ex ante models which focus on substitution, deadweight
loss, labour demand and supply elasticities will capture some of these macro-
e¤ects. However, if the New Deal reduces equilibrium wage pressure then
both the ex post and static ex ante approaches may understate the positive
e¤ects of New Deal on aggregate employment (i.e. fall in the NAIRU).
Consequently we focus on the dynamic e¤ects of the New Deal in enhanc-
ing the employability through boosting an individuals’ productivity. This
could be achieved through job experience which develops ‘hard skills’ (on and
o¤ the job training) and ‘soft skills’ (re-motivation). Whether New Dealers
can keep their jobs after will depend crucially on these e¤ects. Transforming
employability is the key to a¤ecting unemployment.
How large are the e¤ects of job experience on productivity? Previous
studies suggest that the returnsto experience are much lowerforlesseducated
workers who make up the majority of New Dealers. In the paper we use panel
3data from the Labour Force Survey for the 20 quarters prior to the start of
New Deal to estimate the e¤ects of employment duration on gross wages (as
a proxy for worker productivity). We look speci…cally at the New Deal target
group (18-24 year olds who su¤ered some unemployment). After controlling
for gender, age, schooling and macro-economic factors we …nd (on optimistic
assumptions) that a year’s tenure can raise productivity by about 15 percent.
We discuss reasons why these are likely to be overestimates of the treatment
e¤ects of New Deal.
41 Introduction
In 1997 the newly elected UK government announced a general package
of welfare to work reforms directed toward the low wage labour market.
A major component of that reform package was an active labour market
programme aimed speci…cally at the young unemployed. Entitled “the New
Deal for the Unemployed Youth” this was targeted at all young people aged
between 18 to 24 years old who had been claiming job seekers allowance
(unemployed bene…t) for six months or more. All individuals who meet this
requirement, from April 1998 onwards, were eligible for this program. From
June 1998 all adults (25 or older) unemployed for over two years were also
covered by the scheme. This paper assesses alternative approaches to the
evaluation of labour market programmes of this type and provides an initial
evaluation of this speci…c reform.
The programme operates in the following way: After an initial “Gateway”
period (see below), four options are presented to the unemployed. A key
option is a voucher for a subsidy to a prospective employer of £60 per week
(for 6 months) if she hires the job seeker.1 The New Deal has been …nanced
by a £5.2 billion windfall tax on the privatised utilities2 and will be spread
out over a number of years. The aim of the intervention is to enhance the
employability of the long-term unemployed.
Since the programme is still in its initial stages it is too early to attempt
a full evaluation, but it is important to consider the salient issues involved
in performing a proper evaluation. The approach we follow is eclectic. First,
we summarise some of the salient details of the initiative and examine the
1As the Chancellor Gordon Brown put it “There will be no …fth option - to stay at
home on full bene…t”, see Budget Statement, Hansard, 2 July 1997.
2According to HM Treasury (1999) £2.55bn of the total has been allocated speci…cally
to the 18-24 group (1997-2002). See Chennells, 1997, for details of the windfall tax.
5characteristics of those in the target group, the so-called ‘New Dealers’. Sec-
ond, we draw on simple economic models to illustrate how the e¤ects of the
New Deal are likely to a¤ect individuals, employers and the labour market as
a whole. The crucial point here is the need to take an intertemporal or dy-
namic approach in order to understand whether the programme will have any
long-run e¤ects on the employment probabilities of the target group. Will
participants in the programme be able to hold on to a job when their sub-
sidy runs out? Third, (after a brief survey of the existing evidence on wage
subsidies) we propose an empirical strategy for an ex-post evaluation of the
scheme using a ‘trend adjusted di¤erence in di¤erence’ approach. We stress
the di¢culties arising from the absence of any obvious control group with
which to compare the New Deal treatment group. The alternative method
is to build an ex ante general equilibrium model of the labour market and
use existing information to calibrate the parameters of this model. Although
such a task is beyond the scope of this paper we do discuss what would be the
key parameters of the structural model. We then use existing data from the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly panel to try to estimate upper bounds
on the likely e¤ects of the New Deal.
To pre-empt the conclusion, we argue that the e¤ects of the New Deal
may be far more modest than its architects have hoped. Fundamentally this
is because of the di¢culty of raising the skill levels of the unemployed merely
by employment spells (although improving the training element will be very
important here). More positively, we suggest (i) ways in which the New
Deal could be …ne tuned in order to better meet its stated objectives and
(ii) methodologies to construct the appropriate ‘control group’ with which to
compare the young New Dealers.
62 What is the New Deal Reform?
The British Chancellor announced the details of the welfare-to-work pro-
gram, called the New Deal, in the Summer 1997 Budget. The initiative was
o¢cially launched on April 6th 1998 although there were Path…nder area
pilots as early as January 5th of the same year3.
For those aged 18-24 and with an unemployment duration of at least six
months, four New Deal options will be available4. These are:
1. A subsidy equal to £60 (U.S. $100 approximately) per week for 26
weeks to be provided directly to an employer.
2. A job for 6 months on the Environment Taskforce with a wage or an
allowance equal to JSA (unemployment bene…t) plus £400.
3. A job for 6 months with a voluntary sector employer with a wage or an
allowance equal to JSA (unemployment bene…t) plus £400.
4. Entry into full-time education or training for 12 months without loss
of bene…ts for those lacking basic quali…cations (S/NVQ Level 2 or
below).
In the …rst three options the employer must provide the equivalent of
at least one day of education or training per week designed to reach an
accredited quali…cation. A sum of £750 is available to meet these training
costs paid in four installments5.
3There have been other pilot schemes with a very similar design to the New Deal.
These Workstart programmes are discussed in the survey section in Annex I below.
4Some individuals are allowed to be ‘early entrants’. These are usually individuals with
particular needs such as those with diabilities, lone parents, etc.
5For employers who are identi…ed in areas of particular skill shortage an ‘Upfront Skill
Shortage Subsidy’ (announced in December 1998) is available. 75 per cent of this is paid
7Before these options are available to an individual, there is a ‘Gateway’
period lasting for up to four months. During this period the individual
receives extensive help in job search. A specially trained “personal advisor”
from the local Employment Service is assigned to the job seeker. They meet
at least every two weeks and the personal advisor intensively counsels the
job seeker on the best ways to improve their employability.
A substantial proportion of the unemployed are moved o¤ the register
during this Gateway period and will not be o¤ered the four options. By
January 1999 about 108,000 young people had passed through the Gateway.
40 per cent of these had moved into unsubsidised jobs, 13 per cent into
subsidised employment, 30 per cent into full time education and training,
9 per cent into the voluntary sector and 8 per cent into the Environmental
Task Force.
Importantly, there is an element of compulsion in the proposals. Individ-
uals who refuse to take a place in one of the options will be required to take
up a place identi…ed for them by the Employment Service. Failure to comply
without good cause may result in bene…t sanctions being applied. Sanctions
are initially the withdrawal of bene…ts for two weeks. Further refusals will
result in repeated four-weekly withdrawal of bene…ts. About 3 per cent of
New Dealers had sanctions applied in the …rst 6 months of the scheme (New
Deal Press Release 513/98). The introduction of strictly time limited bene…ts
has several implications for the success of the scheme and also its evaluation
which we discuss in more detail below.
For those aged over 25 with an unemployment duration of over 2 years,
two options are under the New Deal.
at the start of the job (£1730) and the rest (£580) 26 weeks later after the achievement
of agreed training objectives. The employer has to guarantee the job lasts for a year and
allow at least 15 days training in the …rst 8 weeks.
8² A subsidy equal to £75 per week for 26 weeks to be provided directly
to an employer.
² entry into full-time employment related education courses for up to 12
months with no loss of bene…t.
There has been an expansion of New Deal provisions for di¤erent target
groups. There are New Deals for the Disabled, for Lone Parents, for the
Partners of the Unemployed, for the Over 50s and even for Schools! These
o¤er many of the same features which have been pioneered on the younger
groups (employment subsidies, intensive job search help, training subsidies).
Anyone re-entering unemployment after being on a New Deal option will
be able to claim JSA under the same conditions but will re-enter a “follow
through” scheme similar to the Gateway. There is a Web site which holds
up to date information on the programme [www.newdeal.gov.uk].
3 Who are the Young New Dealers?
3.1 Characteristics of the young unemployed in Britain
In this section we use data from the British Labour Force Survey (LFS)
to give some indication as to the type of individuals that will be a¤ected by
the New Deal. We focus on recent LFS data before the introduction of the
New Deal in order to provide a benchmark for evaluation. The New Deal
will a¤ect both the economy and also how we interpret the statistics (for a
discussion of the e¤ect of New Deal on labour market statistics see Wood,
1998). Table 1 uses LFS data from December 1997-February 1998. The long-
term unemployed are disproportionately male and low-skilled. 80 per cent
left school at 16 compared with 60 per cent in the corresponding employed
9group. Among the young unemployed there is a similar large gap in educa-
tional attainment compared to those in work. Hence the key characteristic
of those eligible for the New Deal is their low level of skill and consequent
low productivity.
Table 1. Characteristics of the Unemployed
E U U > 2yrs E U > 6mths
25-64 25-64 25-64 18-24 18-24
% male 53.66 61.25 75.43 51.95 67.2
% leaving school at 16 60.13 72.31 80.82 38.63 62.80
% with degrees 15.69 8.34 4.76 9.93 5.65
% with no quals 14.92 27.63 40.21 5.42 21.51
Source: LFS Dec 1997-Feb 1998; E: employed; U: unemployed
Table 2 shows the actual numbers eligible for the New Deal in the …rst
quarter of 1998. We report two measures of the numbers of unemployed
by duration. The ILO measure uses the standardised de…nition of unem-
ployment while the claimant count uses the administrative …gures of those
registered as unemployed and claiming bene…t. It is well known that these
measures di¤er signi…cantly. For example, …gures reported in Labour Mar-
ket Trends show that in Spring 1998 there were 1.840m ILO unemployed in
Great Britain compared with the April claimant count number of 1.390m.
Even these comparisons hide dramatic di¤erences since within the total ILO
…gure, only about 50 per cent are also on the claimant count. Thus even
though the aggregate …gures are broadly similar under either de…nition for
the 18-24 year olds it would be incorrect to assume that the same people
were in both measures.6 Figure 1 illustrates the di¤erent distributions of
unemployment durations for the young and older workers. It is clear that
6The LFS does allow the researcher to condition on claimaint status. Unfortunately
there is a signi…cant undercount of claimaints using the LFS data. Published …gures in
Labour Market Trends simply apply a scaling factor to the LFS data to make it consistent
with the claimant count.
10long-term employment is a far greater problem amongst the old than among
the young.
Table 2. Unemployment by Duration in GB, January 1998
Duration Ages 18-24 Ages 18-24 Ages 25-64
ILO Measure Claimant Count ILO Measure
<3mth 178,885 175,300 375,017
3-6mth 77,960 81,500 186,683
6-12mth 67,419 64,700 181,610
12-24mth 56,860 35,000 162,771
24+ 40,751 18,800 311,778
Total 421,858 375,200 1,217,883
Sources: Labour Force Survey, Dec 1997-Feb 1998
Labour Market Trends Table C12, September 1998
It is of interest to know what would happen to unemployed individuals
in the absence of a welfare-to-work programme. Table 3 gives the six-month
transition rates for di¤erent groups of unemployed people. Individuals who
are ILO unemployed are examined 6 months later. We use data between
September 1996 through February 1998 from the panel element of the LFS
(i.e. pre-New Deal data). We present the data pooled over 4 waves, so we
examine ILO unemployed in September 1996 and their labour market state
in February 1997, ILO unemployed in December 1996 and their status in
May 1997, etc. This is in order to keep a reasonable sample size in each cell7.
Potential duration dependence is evident in that the transition rate into
employment falls signi…cantly for those with long unemployment spells. For
example, for those with spells that have already lasted 2 years of more, the
probability of moving into employment over the next six months is only 17%.
7We have also examined the nine monthly transitions and the data on a quarter by
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Figure 1: Unemployment by Duration, Winter 1997-8
12Such low transition rates explain the motivation for concentrating on such
long-term unemployed people in the welfare-to-work policy proposals. In
contrast, the transition rates into employment for the young unemployed are
much higher. For those with 6-12 month spells, 41% will …nd employment
within six-months. This gives a rather crude indication of the magnitude of
the simple deadweight losses involved in the New Deal. Figures for women
show that transitions into employment are the same as for men but there are
signi…cantly more movements out of the labour force.
Table 3. Six-Month Transition Rates
Employed Unemployed Out of LF Student Observations
Men
All U, 25-60 31.7 55.5 11.9 0.9 4009
>6mth U, 25-60 22.4 64.5 12.7 0.5 2652
>2yrs U, 25-60 16.8 69.8 13.3 0.07 1494
All U, 18-24 39.9 48.5 5.5 6.1 1179
>6mth U, 18-24 33.8 58.2 5.8 2.2 586
6-12mth U, 18-24 41.2 50.5 5.2 3.1 192
Women
All U, 25-60 34.8 37.5 25.8 1.9 2697
>6mth U, 25-60 23.3 49.2 25.6 1.9 1290
>2yrs U, 25-60 15.1 58.7 24.7 1.5 470
All U, 18-24 43.6 34.0 15.5 7.0 718
>6mth U, 18-24 33.1 45.5 18.2 3.3 242
6-12mth U, 18-24 38.3 44.9 14.0 2.8 107
Source: LFS Panel, September 1996-February 1998; all ILO unemployed individuals
sampled in September 1996 through May 1997; transitions are based on employment
status two quarters later.
3.2 Tracking a youth cohort
To get more information on the outcomes that unemployed workers ex-
perience we followed a set of 18-24 year olds who had been unemployed for
13six months or more. We sampled those who had obtained employment by the
next quarter of observation and then tracked them for another two quarters.
It should be noted that the sample sizes involved are rather small so the
results should be viewed as no more than indicative.
Our estimates show that after six months, 64% of the sample are still
in employment while 33% have returned to unemployment. This is a sur-
prisingly high re-unemployment rate and suggests that one mechanism by
which the New Deal may be e¤ective is in keeping these low skilled young
workers in continuous employment for at least six months. Furthermore, we
…nd that only about 30% of those who enter employment receive training
of any form and a very small proportion receive signi…cant training toward
an accredited quali…cation. All those who enter New Deal will receive some
accredited training.
3.3 How much is a £60 wage subsidy actually worth?
The value of the subsidy of £60 per week for those aged 18-24 clearly depends
on the productivity of the target group. Table 4 gives some …gures from the
LFS. We focus attention on the bottom decile of wages since we know from
the above discussion that the vast majority of the unemployed eligible for the
New Deal are low-skilled low-productivity workers who are unlikely to …nd
employment in the middle of the wage distribution. From this perspective
£60 per week is a large fraction of the gross wage, representing over 40%
of the wage at the bottom decile for 21-24 year old males. Another way to
look at this is to consider that these are likely to be workers employed at
National Minimum Wage introduced in April 1999 minimum wage of £3.20
an hour8. For a 35 hour week, the subsidy is worth about 54% of weekly
8Until April 1999 there was no National Minimum Wage in the UK. The minimum
wage is £3.60 for older workers. There were sector speci…c mimimum wages set by Wages
14earnings. Workers between 18 and 21 will initially have a lower wage (£3.00
per hour) and lower average earnings so the subsidy is even more generous.
Against this, there are several hidden costs to the …rm. Employees are
given a day a week o¤ for training and although the employer is compensated
for this with the £750 payment, the disruption and costs may be signi…cant
(for example other co-workers will have to provide some on-the-job train-
ing). Furthermore, there are the costs of bureaucratic compliance including
the government monitoring of training, employment conditions and assorted
red tape. This may be part of the reason why take-up of the subsidised
employment option has been surprisingly low.
Table 4. Gross Weekly Wages, 1997/8
Mean D1 D5 D9 Obs
Males
Age 18-20 163 99 150 239 679
Age 21-24 241 140 221 357 1441
<1yr Tenure, Age 21-24 226 133 209 342 541
<1yr Tenure, Left School 212 125 200 323 228
at 16, Age 21-24
1-2yr Tenure, Age 21-24 246 150 223 369 296
Females
Age 18-20 153 90 150 205 518
Age 21-24 209 130 196 347 1238
<1yr Tenure, Age 21-24 211 130 196 308 520
<1yr Tenure, Left School 177 108 173 268 108
at 16, Age 21-24
1-2yr Tenure, Age 21-24 205 125 192 307 270
Source: LFS, June 1997-Feb 1998; >30 hours per week
D1: 10th percentile; D5: median; D9: 90th percentile
Councils which covered about 2 milliion workers when they were abolished by the previous









Figure 2: E¤ect of subsidy on Employment in Youth Labour Market
This concludes our description of the New Deal target group. Before
formally analysing the e¤ects of experience on the productivity of the target
group using our data we will …rst examine a methodology for evaluating the
likely e¤ects of the New Deal.
4 Wage subsidies
There is a large literature on the e¤ects of wage subsidies, but until
relatively recently it was mostly of a static and partial equilibrium nature9.
Although highly stylised it is a good way of beginning the analysis. Consider
a proportionate subsidy of s, on any group of individuals. The e¤ect of the
subsidy on wages and employment is illustrated in Figure 2.
9The classic references are Kaldor (1936) and Pigou (1933) who were motivated by
calls for wage subsidies during the Great Depression. A recent survey is contained in Katz
(1996) or Hamermesh (1993).
16Notice that in general both wages (W) and employment (N) rise by less
than the value of the subsidy. Because employers will compete for the sub-
sidised workers their wage will rise and this will engender a higher labour
supply. This can be formalised by an upward shift of the labour demand
curve. So, in the general case of a proportional subsidy of s with labour














A special case of this is the ‘world trade’ model. Increases in employment
do not depress marginal products as new …rms enter the market to absorb
the workers and there is an international market for the product (so output
increases by a small country will not decrease price). Essentially in terms
of Figure 2 the labour demand curve is ‡at. Under these conditions all
the subsidy is passed on to workers in the form of higher wage and the
employment e¤ect depends only on the size of the subsidy and the elasticity
of labour supply10.
The main issues that have concerned empirical work using this frame-
work (e.g. NERA, 1995) are the size of the substitution e¤ect, deadweight
and displacement costs. Substitution could occur between the New Dealers
and other groups with similar characteristics such as the short-term unem-
ployed, employed young workersand olderless educated workers. Deadweight
losses are incurred because some of the target group would have moved into
employment without any intervention. Displacement occurs because …rms
using subsidised workers may steal market share from their unsubsidised
counterparts. Estimates of these elements suggest that the number of net
10As ´ ! 1; dln L
ds = ²; d ln W
ds = 1. See Minford (1997) for an example of such a model.
17new jobs created by subsidisation may be quite small. Deadweight (and
therefore Exchequer cost) may be particularly large for young individuals
because their transition rates between unemployment and employment are
particularly high. Our analysis of the LFS in the previous section suggested
that about 33 per cent of the target group would have transited into employ-
ment even in the absence of the New Deal.
Most evaluations taking this partial equilibrium approach …nd that the
deadweight loss and substitution e¤ects are substantial. Many supporters of
low wage subsidiesargue that these are underestimatesofthenet employment
e¤ect. They emphasis that the substitution of the long term unemployed for
short term unemployed will have bene…cial general equilibrium e¤ects in a
labour market characterised by imperfect competition of various sorts (e.g.
Layard, 1997; Snower, 1997; Richardson, 1997a,b). The argument is essen-
tially that the long term unemployed are ‘outsiders’ in the labour market.
They exert little downward pressure on nominal wages (which in these models
is the economic function of unemployment). By making these ‘outsiders’ into
‘insiders’ the equilibrium rate of unemployment is lowered because e¤ective
labour supply is higher. Thus, so the argument goes, although substitution
in the short term mitigates the employment generating e¤ects of subsidies, in
the long-run it is the mechanismby which the ‘natural rate of unemployment’
(or NAIRU) is reduced.
This argument is an important one, but needs some unpacking. It is very
optimistic in the sense of suggesting that the programme will actually raise
GDP11 by reducing a negative externality. The best evidence for this view
is based on the empirical importance of duration dependence in unemploy-
11As we discuss below, this is an increase in GDP in the long run. It is not merely a
short-term Keynesian style demand boost and it is net of any distortionary e¤ects induced
by raising the revenue to fund the scheme.
18ment rates. The longer an individual stays unemployed the less likely he
is to leave unemployment (negative duration dependence). The most likely
explanation for this is the deterioration of human capital when unemployed.
Broadly de…ned, human capital includes not only traditional skills, but the
‘soft skills’ of motivation, punctuality, etc. Even if one accepts this argument
several notes of caution must be added. In the …rst place, most estimates
of duration dependence only …nd important e¤ects after about 1 year rather
than six months (Van den Berg and van Ours, 1994). Furthermore, complete
substitution of the young unemployed for older unemployed workers who
would have got jobs will do nothing to reduce the NAIRU. The 18+ group
with 6-24 months or more of unemployment are particularly vulnerable in
this respect. Finally, controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics
(such as skill, gender and race and worker quality) often reduces the e¤ects
of duration dependence to zero12. Indeed, in a comprehensive survey of the
literature Machin and Manning (1998) conclude: “Our impression is that,
overall, the results for Europe on duration dependence do not seem to sug-
gest any marked negative duration dependence once one controls for a few
readily observable characteristics” (p.32). They do point out, however, that
most UK studies …nd evidence of duration dependence even after controlling
for heterogeneity.
A dynamic model of employment should recognise that the unemployed
pool will generally contain workers with lower productivity, some of whom
have lost work skills through long-term unemployment others of whom will
12There is also evidence from macro-economic wage equations suggesting that the pro-
portion of long term unemployed exerts no downward pressure on earnings growth, al-
though the proportion of short term unemployed does (e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman,
1991). There is some doubt over the econometric reliability of such models, however, as
a more general distributed lag on unemployment levels often does as well as short-term
unemployment terms (e.g. Nickell, 1987).
19have had little skills even to begin with. The only way that a temporary
subsidy can have a permanent e¤ect on the employability of this group is
to raise their productivity through their experience of work. The critical
question with regards to the New Deal is the extent to which participants
will genuinely have their productivity raised so that an employer will have
an incentive to keep them on after the subsidy runs out.
To formalise this notion in a companion paper we consider a dynamic
model of the labour market (Blundell, Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen, 1998).
In a simpli…ed version of this model there are two periods, three sectors and
two types of workers, type I (high productivity) and type II (low productiv-
ity). A worker increases his or her probability of acquiring a real increase
in productivity with tenure (e.g. learning by doing). Variation in the indi-
vidual’s reservation wage generates lower probabilities of the less productive
workers being in employment at any given time. After a period in employ-
ment type II workers look identical to skilled worker with probability, p.
Several issues arise from this simple model. First, it implies a long-run ef-
fect from short-run subsidy. By getting some low skill workers into jobs their
productivity is raised and so their chance of moving out of unemployment
is enhanced. Second, the model raises question of why the unemployed do
not take jobs as an ‘investment’ because of long term gains. The answer is
potentially because of credit constraints (like borrowing to …nance training).
Since these are more likely to e¤ect the young than the old, liquidity con-
straints theories give a rationalisation of targeting the policy on the young at
least in the …rst instance. Nevertheless, there is some doubt over the impor-
tance of credit constraints in the market for human capital. Cameron and
Heckman (1998) for example, argue strongly against their importance in the
U.S. Finally, the model focuses attention on the question of the returns to
20the …rst job for the young , for example the importance of training.
One empirical strategy is to close the model and calibrate it (e.g. Richard-
son, 1997; Orszag and Snower, 1997; Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 199813).
We take a more modest approach below in section 6. Notice however that
the parameters necessary to do this require:
² pay-o¤ to experience/training for the target group;
² participation elasticities for the target group;
² labourdemand elasticities(especially substitution between young work-
ers and other groups of di¤erent skills).
It is di¢cult to get accurate measures of these and a natural question to
ask is whether an ‘ex post’ evaluation of this scheme (or others) would be
more valuable in shedding light on the New Deal. We now turn explicitly to
this evidence.
5 Ex Post Evaluation: A Di¤erential Trend
Adjusted Approach
In Annex I we present a survey of the evidence on the e¤ects of dif-
ferent wage subsidy schemes. We focus on those which are most relevant
to the New Deal. There are several important lessons from this brief sur-
vey. Firstly, it seems that employee-based subsidies seem to have a larger
employment impact than employer-based subsidies, contrary to simple eco-
nomic theory which argues for symmetry. This is also consistent with the
evidence from the Work Trials in Britain. One rationalisation of this …nding
13Only the latter paper really allows for unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous skill
acquisition.
21is that stigma e¤ects may be very important as employers treat the holding
of a voucher as a signal that the prospective employee is of low quality. It
is often argued that these stigma e¤ects can be ignored because (i) the New
Deal covers a much wider group than is typical in the U.S. and (ii) long-
term unemployment is a worse signal in the U.S. than in Europe because
there are relatively few American long term unemployed. This might be too
optimistic. Workers failing to get a job in the ‘Gateway’ may be perceived
to be ‘the worst of the lot’ and therefore become stigmatised (the education
and training options have proven more popular amongst New Dealers than
the subsidised employment route). Additionally, employers may believe that
the unemployed with the best potential will self select themselves into the
education and training category.
A crucial feature of any ex post evaluation is the need for a valid con-
trol group to compare with the treatment group. There are two key features
needed in order to make a quasi-experiment useful. First, the composition of
the group must be stable over the course of experiment. Second, the groups
must be subject to (and react in the same way to) common trends. Since the
New Deal is a nationwide initiative there is no obvious control group14. One
might think of using the unemployed in di¤erent age groups (e.g. 25-30 year
olds) since their productivity is likely to be close to the New Dealers and
consequently they may be expected to be subject to similar macro shocks.
Unfortunately this group is likely to be most a¤ected by substitution e¤ects
so fails the …rst criterion (stable composition). So why not use older groups
instead? Older groups, however, have very di¤erent productive characteris-
tics and may respond di¤erently to shocks such as the state of the business
cycle. Thus they fail on the second criterion (common trends). One possible
14There are Path…nder pilots in selected areas but since they began in January 1998
they had very little time to run before the New Deal began in April 1998.
22solution is to examine how the older group have responded di¤erentially to
the state of the cycle compared to the younger group in similar periods of the
business cycle to control for this e¤ect. These considerations suggest that
we should examine in detail the pre-programme behaviour of the New Deal
target group and the various possible control groups.
The removal of common trends or time e¤ects is worthy of further discus-
sion. The assumption will be that these time e¤ects, that a¤ect both control
and treatment groups, at the time of the reform are not a consequence of
the reform itself. It is therefore validly to abstract from them as part of
the quasi-experimental evaluation method. However, there are good reasons
why this may not be the case. In particular, if the programme has global
e¤ect in reducing wage pressure then there may be a consequent increase in
overall demand for labour and employment. To the extent to which these are
common to all the groups being considered, the quasi-experimental method
will remove these e¤ects along with all other common time e¤ects. Thus it
will underestimate the impact of the reform.
We have already argued that such global wage pressure e¤ects - or gen-
eral equilibrium e¤ects - may be an important feature of this reform. As a
consequence the quasi-experimental evaluation will only recover di¤erential
e¤ects between treatment and comparison groups and will not capture these
potentially important consequences of the reform. In the absence of these
general equilibrium e¤ects we will argue that the quasi-experimental method
developed in this section provides an upper bound on the impact of the re-
form. This will not be the case in the presence of such general equilibrium
e¤ects. It will still be possible to assess whether the reform has had an im-
pact, but the complete evaluation will require a model of the feedback e¤ects
on the whole economy as presented in section 4.
23To formalise the quasi-experimental method we propose, suppose Yit rep-
resents the outcome variable of interest. The most obvious candidate is
employment status, but we could also consider duration of unemployment or
earnings for individual i in period t: Suppose we select individuals accord-
ing to some common eligibility criteria: e.g. aged 18-24, 12 months after
a period of 6 months unemployment. This set of individuals will also have
observable characteristics Xit which will include such variables as age, gen-
der, education, prior work experience, etc. The objective of the evaluation
described here is to …nd the e¤ect of the New Deal on eligible participants.
Suppose using the participant and nonparticipant data sources we measure
Yit for a group who satisfy the eligibility criteria but who are observed before
the programme begins. Label this period t = t
1: We also have available data
for eligibles (all 18-24 year olds unemployed for 6 months are eligible and
participation is essentially compulsory). Label this period t = t2: 15
Write the relationship between the New Deal and Y as
Yit = °iDiN + ¯
0Xit + uit
where DiN is a new deal “dummy” that takes the value unity for those
individuals who are eligible and have participated in the program. Note that
we allow the New Deal to have heterogeneous treatment e¤ects on di¤erent
individuals as indicated by the subscript on °i: We now consider di¤erent
econometric estimators. First, de…ne the simple di¤erence estimator (d °D) as
:
d °D = e Yt2 ¡ e Yt1 (2)
15In the present context t1 is around April 1998 and t2 around April 1999. We have to
allow at least nine months after April 1998 for the Gateway (up to four months) and the
subsidy period itself (six months). An extra three months is a minimum smoothing over
the transitional period. Clearly there are likley to be longer term a¤ects so individuals
need to be followed through their working lives.
24where




E[:] is the expectations operator. In equation (2) we are measuring the
di¤erence between the (regression adjusted) mean outcomesfor the treatment
group before and after the policy intervention. In the empirical application
we replace the population means by their sample analogues. When will d °D
consistently estimate the average ° among those that enter the New Deal?
The answer to our question depends on the structure of the unobservables
uit:
In line with the standard approach in this area the unobservables are
assumed to have two additive components, an individual e¤ect uncorrelated
across individuals that is possibly time varying "it and a macro e¤ect that
may di¤er in its impact across individuals kimt :
uit = "it + kimt:
For (2) to consistently estimate ° we require
E(uitjt = s;Xis) = ¹: (4)
for all s. That is that the unobservables need not have mean zero but must
be constant over the before and after periods. This is equivalent to requiring
that the group we choose before the New Deal has the same composition
of unobservables as the actual New Deal participants and that the macro
conditions remain the same. The …rst of these assumptions can be made
more realistic by carefully choosing the period t1 group according to the
eligibility criteria and controlling for any remaining observable di¤erences
25through Xit.16 The second requirement is more di¢cult to meet and will
clearly not be satis…ed if there is any systematic change in the macro economy
that a¤ects the New Deal target group. This is the reason for choosing a
comparison group and using ‘di¤erence in di¤erences’ techniques.
Suppose there is a control group, say an older cohort of mature men or
women, that is considered less likely to be directly a¤ected by the New Deal.
Clearly, younger cohorts only a little older than the target group are not
suitable due to the substitution e¤ects discussed above. Suppose we label
this comparison group C and label the target group T: If we can measure
Yit and Xit for this comparison group a di¤erence in di¤erences estimator
( d °DID)would have the form:
d °DID = (e Y
T
t2 ¡ e Y
T
t1 ) ¡ (e Y
C
t2 ¡ e Y
C
t1 ): (5)
Where e Y T
tj = E[(Yit ¡ b ¯
0
Xit)jt = tj;g = T]; where g denotes whether an
individual is in T (Treatment group) or C (Comparison group).
This would be a consistent estimator of ° if the unobservables satisfy
E(uitjt = s;i 2 g;Xis) = "g + kms (6)
for all g and s where i 2 g indicates an individual in group C or T: Condition
(6) generalises (4) by allowing a macro or general trend e¤ect.17 However,
this macro e¤ect is required to be the same across the target and comparison
groups. Sincethe youngand theold typically attract di¤erential macroe¤ects
over a cycle (see below) this requirement is unlikely to be met. However, a
further adjustment to correct for this is possible.
16For example, that they are the same age, had a spell of at least 6 months unemploy-
ment, etc.
17See Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998).
26To allow each group to respond di¤erentially to business cycle e¤ects we
write
E(uitjt = s;i 2 g;Xis) = "g + kgms; (7)
for all g and s where the kg acknowledges the di¤erential macro e¤ect across
the two groups. Now it can be seen that the di¤-in-di¤ estimator d °DID in
(5) consistently estimates
plim d °DID = ° + (kT ¡ kC)[mt2 ¡mt1] (8)
which clearly only recovers the true e¤ect of the programme when kT = kC:
Now suppose we take another time interval t0 to t¤, over which a similar
macro trend has occurred. Precisely, we require a period for which the macro
trend matches the term (kT ¡ kC)[mt2 ¡ mt1] in (8). For example, we could
compare a period in the early 1990s. This can only be chosen when the
macro environment facing the participants leaving the programme in period
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will now consistently estimate °:
Which comparison period is chosen for this trend adjustment to di¤er-
ence in di¤erences requires careful consideration. It is likely that the most
recent cycle is the most appropriate, since earlier cycles may have system-
atically di¤erent e¤ects across the target and comparison groups. However,
using time series information from several business cycles will give greater
credibility to this method. In fact the comparison over several points of dif-
ferent business cycles is likely to be a good speci…cation test of the model.18
In general if there exists su¢cient time series history on each group then it
18Analogous to an overidenti…cation test.
27may be possible to model secular movements in employment as well as cycle
e¤ects. These can then be removed from the di¤erence in di¤erence measure
as in (9).
The analysis could also be repeated for a number of alternative control
groups. In principle we could get di¤erent answers from using di¤erent age
groups. If these di¤erences are large then it is indicative of a mispeci…cation
of the original model.
To investigate this approach further Figure 3 plots the employment-
population ratios for men in two groups. Britain experienced a boom in
the late 1980s, a recession in the early 1990s and a subsequent recovery after
1992. Although both younger and older men are a¤ected by the cycle it is
obvious that youth unemployment is much more cyclically sensitive. Failure
to account for the di¤erential trend over the cycle would severely bias our
estimates of the e¤ects of the New Deal.
The critical assumption in all this analysis is that the comparison group
is una¤ected by the New Deal. There are three reasons why this condition
may fail. The …rst is the substitution e¤ect which will tend to exaggerate the
impact of the New Deal. As mentioned above, this is because similar groups
to the target group will su¤er by …nding employment more di¢cult due to
increased competition from New Dealers.
A second important issue is whether the New Deal induces compositional
changes in the stock of individuals who reach the 6 month unemployment
mark. For example, if the Gateway period is perceived as ‘tougher’ than
the previous regime individuals may be more likely to exit just before start
of the Gateway. The U.S. evidence on time-limited unemployment bene…ts
suggests that there is indeed such a spike in hazard rates (e.g. Katz and

































Figure 3: Male Employment-Population ratios for di¤erent age groups
29indicated an e¤ect of moving bene…t claimants o¤ the unemployment register
(Dolton and O’Neill, 1996). On the other hand, it may be that the promise of
job help, subsidised work and cheaper training encourages more short-term
unemployed to stay on for longer durations. In either case the composition
of the young long term unemployed will be di¤erent pre and post New Deal.
How large these e¤ects are can only be gauged by examining the changing
transitions rates for the short term unemployed (as well as the long term
unemployed) pre and post program19.
Finally, we can return to the discussion of likely importance of general
equilibrium issues for the New Deal evaluation. Proponents of the New Deal
argue that there will be a bene…cial e¤ect on aggregate unemployment. This
can work through the standard wage pressure arguments discussed in Section
4 whereby the New Deal participants act more like short term unemployed
and place more downward pressure on wages.
What can we say to this critique? First, notice that these general equi-
librium arguments imply that there must be a greater e¤ect on New Dealers
than others so the size of the coe¢cient d °DADID is still a valid indication that
there is a positive impact from the program. Second we have some reason
to doubt how large these e¤ects are likely to be - it seems highly unlikely
that older skilled workers, for example, will be much a¤ected by the New
Deal group. Thirdly, it may be that the distortions induced by the New
Deal actually create greater deadweight losses than expected so the general
equilibrium e¤ects are not so bene…cial. Finally, and most importantly, the
discussion illustrates the need to supplement our ex post analysis with an
ex ante model of the sort discussed in Section 4. In the next section we
explicitly address whether the New Deal is likely to have large productivity
19Early qualititive results suggest that the New Deal is viewed more more positively by
young people than the previous job search regime (IES, 1999).
30e¤ects on the young unemployed.
6 Empirical analysis of the e¤ects of experi-
ence on productivity for New Dealers
Themost important parameterin the ex ante model isthe e¤ect of aspell
of employment on worker productivity. To keep their job after the subsidy
runs out, it seems likely that the workers will have to have improved their
productivity to the point at which the employer is prepared to continue to
pay a wage that is higher than the worker’s reservation wage20. Measuring
individual productivity directly is di¢cult, so as is standard we resort to
using employee gross wages as an index of productivity.
The evidence from Table 4 regarding 1-2 year tenure workers suggests
that there is a return to experience of about 8.8% for men in their early
twenties ((£246-£226)/£226). Table 5 attempts to examine this slightly more
systematically for the particular group a¤ected by the New Deal: those with
some recent experience of unemployment. We selected all employees aged
between 18 and 24 who had reported that they were unemployed in any
one of the four previous quarters. Until mid 1997 LFS only asked the wage
question in the …nal …fth wave before an individual leaves the panel. A series
of ‘job duration dummy variables’ were de…ned as follows:
D0 = 1 if unemployed t¡ 1 and employed in t
D1 = 1 if unemployed t¡ 2 and employed in t¡ 1 and t
D2 = 1 if unemployed t¡ 3 and employed in t¡ 2;t¡ 1 and t
D3 = 1 if unemployed t¡ 4 and employed in t¡ 3;t¡ 2;t ¡ 1 and t
20The government is requiring employers to undertake ‘moral contracts’ that oblige …rms
not to lay o¤ New Dealers when their subsidy runs out. These have no standing in law so
it is doubtful how e¤ective they will be in practice.
31Since each t is one quarter of the LFS, on average we are picking up
information on the earnings distribution after one and half months of a job
(D0); four and a half months (D1), seven and a half months (D2) and ten
and a half months (D3): The ‘e¤ect’ of a six month spell of job duration is
then the di¤erence between D2 and D0. The raw di¤erentials in columns (1)
is very large, particularly for the lowest decile (column (2)). Some of this is
simple due to hours: column (3) shows that wage growth is about 9% in the
…rst 6 months.
There are strong reasons to think that we may be overestimating the size
of the experience related wage gains. The sample size declines as we examine
the longer duration dummies and this is probably because the least produc-
tive workers are unable to keep their jobs for long periods. Thus the ‘duration
e¤ect’ is a mixture of a causal e¤ect of experience on wages and a spurious
e¤ect arising from a failure to properly control for individual productivity.
Since it is probably an ‘upper bound’ we attempt two ways of controlling
for productivity. First we do this is a non-parametric way by estimating the
number of workers who drop out of employment each period and delete this
proportion from the lower end of earnings distribution. This assumes that
workers failing to keep their jobs are all drawn from the lower tail of the
wage distribution (the lowest productivity workers). This is unlikely to be
completely true so we are actually estimating a lower bound to the tenure
e¤ect. The re-calculations of the means of this truncated distribution is given
in column (4) of Table 5. The lower bound at the mean is actually negative.
Negative returns are not credible, and we interpret the result to suggest that
the upward biases from selectivity may be large, but are di¢cult to estimate
non-parametrically with any precision.
32Table 5:
Earnings Growth for 18-24 year olds with an unemployment spell
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Duration of Wkly Earnings Wkly Earnings Hrly Wage Hrly Wage
employment Mean lowest decile Mean truncated mean
D0 (0 ¡ 3 months) 145.05 (400) 51.85 (400) 4.40 (398) 5.23 (267)
D1 (3 ¡ 6 months) 142.11 (356) 54.96(356) 4.21 (356) 4.79 (267)
D2 (6 ¡ 9 months) 154.51 (278) 68.44(278) 4.44 (277) 4.54 (268)
D3 (9 ¡ 12 months) 164.83 (266) 67.41(266) 4.82 (266) 4.82(266)
(D3 ¡ D0)=D0 6.5% 30% 9.1% -13.2%
(D3 ¡ D0)=D0 13.6% 30% 9.5% -7.8%
Notes: Number of observations in parantheses; all workers full time (at least 30
hours a week); 1998 Q1 prices; sample is all 18-24 year olds who were
unemployed in at least one of the 5 QLFS waves 1992-1997
A second way of dealing with di¤erent productivity e¤ects is to control
for observable characteristics of individuals. This allows us to systematically
test the signi…cance of the association of earnings growth with job duration.
To do this we run a log(hourly wage) equation of the following form :
LnWagei = ®0 + ®1D1i + ®2D2i + ®3D3i + ¯
0Xi + "i
where the observables (X0
is) in the model include quarter dummies, age,
gender, years of schooling, log hours21. All unobservables (") are assumed to
be uncorrelated with the control variables. To give some idea of the e¤ects
Table 6 reports the estimated a coe¢cients for a model with no X variables
21We also experimented with many other variables and interactions which were insignif-
icant at conventional levels. These included schooling-female interaction, age-female inter-
action, training dummy, female-hours interaction. Dropping the potentially endogenous
hours variable also makes little di¤erence to the results.
33in column (1). As seen in Table 5 there is no duration e¤ects until 6-9 months
and the big increase comes in the 9-12 month period. The second column
conditions on the observables. As expected there are signi…cant and positive
e¤ects of age, being male, and having more education. More interestingly, the
duration e¤ects are reduced from column (1) although the longest duration
remains signi…cant.
34Table 6: ln(Hourly Wage) Regressions for New Deal Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D1 (3 ¡ 6 months employment) -0.002 0.002 0.017 -
0.034 0.032 0.039
D2 (6 ¡ 9 months employment) 0.043 0.035 0.028 -
0.036 0.035 0.041
D3 (9 ¡ 12 months employment) 0.117 0.095 0.070 0.067
0.037 0.036 0.044 0.033
(U > 6) ¤ D0 - -0.062 -
0.048
(U > 6) ¤ D1 - -0.103 -
0.048
(U > 6) ¤ D2 - -0.043 -
0.059
(U > 6) ¤ D3 - 0.017 -
0.057
(U > 6) ¤ (D0;D1) - -0.084
0.031
Y ears of Schooling - 0.026 0.025 0.025
0.006 0.006 0.006
Female - -0.060 -0.063 -0.062
0.025 0.026 0.026
Age - 0.056 0.056 0.056
0.007 0.007 0.007
Quarterly dummies (18) ? No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.013 0.126 0.132 0.131
N 1012 1012 1012 1012
Notes:- Robust standard errors in italics; individuals aged 18-24
between 1992Q4 and 1997Q4 (ends Feb 1998) who had at least one
unemployment spell; at least 30 hours worked a week; estimation by OLS.
U > 6 indicates if the unemployment spell was of at least 6 months duration
35In the LFS it is possible to distinguish the length of the spell of unem-
ployment as individuals are asked questions directly. We use this information
to distinguish which individuals in the sample were U > 0 (unemployed for
6 months or more). D0 can be identi…ed for those with long unemployment
spells. Interacting the length of the prior unemployment spell with employ-
ment duration throws up an interesting pattern. At face value the coe¢cients
suggest that the long-term unemployed begin employment at a wage about
6% lower than the short-term unemployed. Their wage growth 6-12 months
after gaining employment appears faster than those who were unemployed
for shorter periods. By the end of the …rst year of employment their wages
are identical to those who got a job after a short unemployment spell22. Al-
though the standard errors are large around these estimates the qualitative
pattern holds if we go to a more parsimonious model in column (4)23.
>From this analysis we might infer that, on extremely generous assump-
tions, the New Deal target group could have 15% growth in their productivity
if they remain in the job for a year. Since in section 3.3 we estimated that
the rate of subsidy given to a typical New Dealer was 40-50% of her wage it
seems likely that New Dealers whose productivity is well below the wage will
not be able to keep their jobs when their employment subsidy runs out. Fur-
thermore, notice from our estimates that after six months (when the subsidy
runs out) wage growth is still small - in fact, insigni…cantly di¤erent from
zero. Existing empirical work which examines experience e¤ects over longer
time periods than we consider here also suggests that experience returns are
22Gregory and Jukes (1997) use the matched NES/JUVOS data to examine the e¤ects
of unemployment on wages. They …nd that the post-employment wages of the unemployed
young (21-24) catch up with the continuously employed young after a year’s employment.
This is not true for older workers.
23Compared to the previous column we have dropped D1, D2, (U > 6 ¤ D3) and
U > 6 ¤ D4. Also the interactions between U > 6 and D0 and D1 are constrained to be
the same. These restrictions are not statistically rejected by the data (F-test = 0.304)
36low for less educated workers (who form the majority of New Dealers as we
showed in Section 3)24. For such low productivity workers, unless there are
ways to keep the young workers in work for much longer than six months, it
is unlikely that the New Deal can have large e¤ects from productivity growth
alone25. The main impact of the reform will be on workers whose produc-
tivity levels are only slightly below the o¤ered wage and for whom the …rm
is extracting a reasonable “rent” over the period of the subsidy. For these
the productivity growth may be su¢cient for them to remain in employment
once the subsidy is removed. How many of these workers are likely to be in
the eligible pool of unemployed after the Gateway period is di¢cult to tell,
but it maybe quite small.
To complete the model we need to assess the impact of the element of
compulsion in the New Deal on participation in work. If welfare recipients
are faced with a new regime of severe cuts in their bene…ts if they refuse a
New Deal position26, then this will increase the incentives to …nd work. In
this case e¤ective labour supply is increased not simply through the increase
in human capital, as we have been assuming, but in addition by reducing the
reservation wage. In practice, the ‘stick’ of sanctions have not been heavily
used27.
24For example, Gosling, Meghir and Machin (1998).
25We also experimented with examining the e¤ects of training. There were positive
interactions between training and job duration but again, they were very imprecisely de-
termined. Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1996) …nd evidence of strong e¤ects of employer
provided training on wages. However, this was for workers with a good deal more education
and work experienece than is likely for the participants in the New Deal.
26There is a view that there are already severe penalties in place. The young unemployed
have been under substantial pressure to actively job search with the threat of bene…t
withdrawal since the early 1980s.
27The Chancellor announced moves to toughen sanctions in his 1999 Budget (HM Trea-
sury 1999).
377 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the likely e¤ects of the UK Government’s
New Deal for unemployed youth. The initiative is a major programme and
is being closely watched by other European countries as a possible way out
of the problem of wide scale joblessness. The target group were identi…ed as
having characteristics associated with low productivity and we argued that
a key rationale of the scheme is to enhance their employability by making
them more productive. Potentially, productivity could increase through the
experience/tenure e¤ect and training opportunities associated with having a
job. This dynamic e¤ect could make a temporary subsidy have a permanent
e¤ect on unemployment.
We considered two evaluation methodologies. We proposed an ex post
evaluation based around a ‘trend adjusted di¤erence in di¤erences’ approach
which could potentially deal with many of the econometric problems associ-
ated with evaluation. We emphasised, however, that this must be comple-
mented with an ex ante model based approach. Suggesting a simple model we
tried to estimate a key parameter: the e¤ect of job duration on productivity
(as measured by the wage) for the target group using micro data from the
LFS. Our conclusion was that the productivity e¤ects are relatively modest
compared to the size of subsidy deemed necessary to get the group into jobs.
Thus it is likely that the e¤ects of the policy will be far more modest than
its proponents have hoped for. Although this conclusion must await more
detailed analysis and the closing of the model we believe it is a useful …rst
attempt to tackle the evaluation problem.
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8 ANNEX I: A Survey of wage subsidy schemes
The empirical evidence can be neatly divided into two sections. First we
examine experience with subsidies to employers that take on a particular
group of workers. These generally take the form of a tax credit that …rms
can o¤set against their tax liabilities or a direct payment to the …rm from the
government. More general employment subsidies and marginal subsidies are
outside of the scope of this paper since welfare-to-work schemes are clearly
targeted toward particular groups. Second, we look at schemes that provide
subsidies to particular workers to take employment. These tend to be o¤ered
as tax credits on an individuals income tax liability (e.g. Earned Income Tax
Credit in the US) or as direct payments through the social security system
(e.g. Family Credit in the UK). There are now several surveys of such subsidy
schemes (see NERA, 1994, or Gardiner, 1997 for example). In this section
we focus on those policy experiments most relevant for the U.K experience.
8.1 Targeted Subsidies to Employers
8.1.1 The US Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) was introduced in the US in 1978
and remained in e¤ect until 1994. It o¤ers a tax credit to employers who
hire certi…ed target group individuals. The target groups eligible for the
credit have varied over time but have included economically disadvantaged
youths, public assistance and SSI claimants and certain ex-convicts. Eligible
44individuals were issued with vouchers which they gave to employers who
could then apply for the tax credit. As of late 1986, the scheme provided a
tax credit amounting to 40% for the …rst $6000 of wages for 12 months.
An analysis of the employment implications of the TJTC has been con-
ducted by Bishop and Montgomery (1993). Using a sample of about 3,500
…rms, they examine whether the growth in employment in an establishment
is related to the growth in the proportion of TJTC subsidised workers in the
…rm. Their results suggest that for every ten subsidised hirings in the …rm,
approximately three new jobs are created. Of course this implies that seven
out of ten TJTC payments are for workers in jobs that would have existed
without the subsidy, implying a large deadweight loss. However, Bishop
and Montgomery do …nd evidence to suggest that the subsidy encourages
employers to hire those eligible for the scheme, possibly at the expense of
non-eligible workers.
A signi…cant problem with much of this evidence is that it is di¢cult to
isolate the true e¤ect of the tax credit on employment from the fact that
…rms that are expanding employment may be more aware of the availability
of the tax credit. Katz (1996) argues that changes in the eligibility criteria
of the TJTC provide exogenous sources of variation that helps to identify
the impact of the tax credit on the labour market outcomes of the target
group. In 1989, 23-24 year olds were made ineligible for the programme while
those aged 18-22 maintained their eligibility. Katz analyses the employment
rates of disadvantaged 23-24 year olds before and after the eligibility change.
Comparing this change with the change in employment rates of non- dis-
advantaged 23-24 year olds provides a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimate of
the impact of TJTC eligibility on the employment rate of the target group.
This produces an estimate of -0.030 (s.e. 0.017), indicating a 3 percentage
point decline in the employment of disadvantaged to non-disadvantaged 23-
24 year olds after elimination of their eligibility for TJTC. To control for the
possibility that other labour market factors have di¤erential e¤ects on dis-
advantaged and non-disadvantaged workers, Katz examines the employment
rates of disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged workers for those who were
una¤ected by the legislative change. He …nds that over the time period con-
sidered, the employment rate of the disadvantaged actually rose relative to
45the non-disadvantaged by 0.013. Hence the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate
underestimates the e¤ect of removing TJTC eligibility. When this is cor-
rected for, Katz estimates that the impact on disadvantaged 23-24 year olds
was to reduce their employment rate by 4.3 percentage points. Controlling
for observables using a regression model reduces this e¤ect to 3.4 (s.e. 1.9).
8.1.2 Australia: The Job Compact
Finn (1997) reports on the experience of the Australian government in of-
fering Jobstart subsidies to the long-term unemployed (18 month+ unem-
ployed). The evidence suggests that employers were not keen on taking on
the LTU even with subsidies as there were concerns about “the low-skill
levels, poor attitudes to work and low levels of motivation” of the LTU. Fur-
thermore, the Australian government concluded that it was unclear whether
LTU individuals who were recycled into short-term unemployment were re-
ally competitive job seekers.
8.1.3 The UK Workstart Pilots
In the 1993 Budget, the Chancellor announced the introduction of a pilot
scheme to provide subsidies to those who had been continuously unemployed
for more than 2 years. The subsidy provided employers with £60 per week
for 26 weeks and then £30 per week for 26 weeks. The pilots were run in
Tyneside, Devon and Cornwall, East Kent and South West London.
The results of a survey of participating employers was reported by Atkin-
son and Meager (1994). They sampled 399 …rms distributed across the four
pilot regions. They …nd that participating employers tended to be small,
private …rms in the service sector and tended to be o¤ering low-skill employ-
ment. Many of the employers claimed that they traditionally recruited from
the long-term unemployed which suggests that there is a certain amount of
deadweight loss associated with the subsidy. Three quarters of respondents
believed that the subsidy had some in‡uence on their sta¢ng levels, though
only 42% thought it very important. Furthermore, a smaller percentage
thought that the subsidy in‡uenced them toward employing the long-term
unemployed, even though these were the only workers eligible for the sub-
46sidy. Most employers reported that those employed with the subsidy were
of an adequate standard and were on average as productive as other new
recruits. Atkinson and Meager suggest that only 17% of the workstart va-
cancies represented new employment that would not have existed without
the subsidy. They also conclude that substitution was signi…cant with much
of the employment of the long-term unemployed occurring at the expense of
the shorter term unemployed.
8.2 Tax Credits to Workers
8.2.1 The US Earned Income Tax Credit
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is given to individuals whose taxable
income is below a de…ned threshold (about 28,000 in 1996)and who have a
dependent child. The amount of the credit depends upon the individuals
earned income and number of children. For example, for a family of two
or more children in 1996, the credit is phased in at a 40% rate on the …rst
$8890 of income, giving a maximum credit of $3556. In the income range
$8890 to $11610 the credit remains at this maximum level. The credit is then
phased out on income above $11610 at a 21% rate so that individuals are
no longer eligible for the credit when income reaches the de…ned threshold.
Figure 2 shows how the EITC a¤ects the budget constraint. Compared to
the no-EITC budget constraint given by AE, EITC produced kinks in the
constraint. Between A and B, the value of the tax credit rises as hours
increase up to the maximum credit of $3556. Between B and C the credit
remains at the maximum level and the budget constraint is parallel to the
non-EITC constraint. Over the section C to D, the credit is slowly withdrawn
until it is zero at point D. It is clear that any eligible taxpayer who was
working prior to EITC would still prefer to work (though possibly for fewer
hours) and that some individuals may be induced to work because of the
credit. Hence the impact of EITC on participation of eligible taxpayers is
unambiguous.
Eissa and Liebman (1996) attempt to estimate the laboursupply response
to the EITC. They examine the response of single women with children to
47Figure 4: The Impact of EITC on After-Tax Earnings
an expansion of the EITC in 1987. The 1987 expansion raised the phase-in
rate of the credit and increased the maximum income to which the subsidy
rate was applied. This had the e¤ect of creating a set of individuals who
became eligible for the …rst time. At all levels of earnings the EITC amount
after the expansion was at least as large as it was before. They suggest
comparing the participation rates of single women with children before and
afterthe tax change toassess the impact of EITC. Howeversince otherfactors
were likely to have changed at the same time e.g. the state of the business
cycle, it is necessary to have a control group. Eissa and Liebman suggest
using single women without children as the control group since they are not
eligible for EITC but otherwise may react in a similar way to the treatment
group to other general economic shocks. Hence comparing the change in
participation rates for the treatment group relative to the change experienced
by the control group gives a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of the e¤ect of
EITC. Since the identi…cation strategy relies upon a timing e¤ect it is crucial
that the treatment group response to other shocks is the same as the response
of the control group and that there are no other contemporaneous shocks that
a¤ect the treatment group but not the control group.
48Eissa and Liebman …nd that the participation rate of the treatment group
increased by 2.4 percentage points (72.9% to 75.3%) at the time of the tax
change. In contrast there was no change in the participation rate of the con-
trol group (95.2%). Hence the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate suggests that
EITC increased participation by 2.4 percentage points, with a standard error
of 0.6. Of course the treatment and control group do not have the same dis-
tribution of observable characteristics and this may distort inference. When
observable characteristics are controlled for, the estimated participation re-
sponse falls to 1.9 percentage points but is still statistically signi…cant. While
these results suggest signi…cant incentive e¤ects from the EITC on participa-
tion, two points should be borne in mind. First, it is arguable as to whether
the identi…cation assumptions are reasonable. The participation rate of sin-
gle women with children may well di¤er in it’s cyclical sensitivity to that for
single women without children. In this case the identi…cation assumption is
invalid and the claimed causal e¤ect cannot be sustained. Second the authors
…nd no evidence of an hours e¤ect from the EITC change even though the
standard model would predict that EITC recipients who are already working
should have reduced their hours of work. The absence of this e¤ect again
casts doubt on the identi…cation strategy.
Dickert, Houser and Scholz (1995) also …nd positive e¤ects from EITC ex-
pansion on labour force participation. They estimate a joint model of labour
force participation and welfare recipients that depends, upon other things,
on net predicted wages. The impact of changes in EITC can then be simu-
lated by estimating the change in net wages produced by the EITC change.
They estimate that e¤ect of an expansion of EITC that occurred in 1993.
This dramatically increased the phase-in credit rate so that an individual
with 2 or more children experienced a rise in the rate from 19.5% in 1993 to
30.0% in 1994. The maximum possible credit for the same individual rose
from $1511 to $2528. Their simulations suggest that this change increased
the labour force participation of single parents by 3.3 percentage points as
a result of increasing the net wage of such individuals by 15%. They also
suggest that the combined e¤ect of individuals leaving welfare programmes
and using EITC generates savings of over $2bn, since mean EITC payments
are signi…cantly smaller than welfare programme payments.
498.2.2 The Canadian Self-Su¢ciency Project
A major welfare-to-work experiment is currently being undertaken by the
Canadian government. The Self-Su¢ciency Project (SSP) is an earnings
supplement programme for single parents who have been on welfare for at
least 12 of the last 13 months. The scheme is very generous, providing a
supplement equal to one-half of the di¤erence between a participant’s gross
labour earnings and a target earnings level. The target earnings level was
set above average earnings for full-time females in the two provinces in which
the experiment was conducted.28So, for example, the target earnings level in
British Columbia was set at $37,000. An SSP participant who worked 30
hours per week (1,500 hours per year) at $7 per hour would earn $10,500 per
year and would collect a $13,250 supplement. Unearned income and the earn-
ings of other family members do not a¤ect the supplement payment. Finally
the scheme imposes a full-time work requirement (30 hours per week).Those
who participate in the scheme are eligible for SSP payments for up to 36
months.
The scheme was implemented as a randomised experiment and has been
analysed by Card and Robbins (1996). A random sample of welfare recipi-
ents who met the eligibility criteria in British Columbia and New Brunswick
were selected and were then randomly assigned into either the control group
(1,056 individuals) or the programme group (1,066 individuals). The individ-
uals provided retrospective information on labour market experience at the
baseline survey and a second survey was conducted 18 months after the date
of random assignment. There was a clear trend toward both higher earnings
and employment rates for both the control and programme group. However
the trend is far more pronounced for programme participants. For example,
programme participants have signi…cantly higher monthly earnings within 5
months of the baseline and are earning roughly $100 per month more than
the control group 18 months into the program. Similarly positive e¤ects are
realised for the employment rate. Card and Robbins also show that the pro-
gramme group are signi…cantly more likely to have ceased welfare recipiency
28Note that while SSP is aimed at single parents regardless of sex, 95% of those eligible
were women.
50and to receive smaller welfare payments.
Although all the results discussed do suggest that the SSP is having
signi…cant success on moving individuals o¤ welfare and into work, there are
two important provisos. First, those in the programme group receive SSP
supplements for 36 months from the baseline. At present we do not know
what the long-run e¤ect of the programme will be when these payments
cease. It is unfortunately possible that the programme recipients will return
to welfare upon the expiry of the programme and there may be no long-run
di¤erence between the programme and control group. Second, when welfare
and SSP payments are combined, it is found that the programme group
costs about $100 per month more in government transfers than the control
group. Against this we should note that the programme group have average
gross incomes that are about $230 more than the control group as a result
of both higher earnings and welfare payments so that the scheme is having
substantial anti-poverty e¤ects.
8.3 Comparing employer and employee subsidies
To conclude this Annex we also consider some papers which set up ex-
periments comparing employer versus employee subsidies. Woodbury and
Spiegelman (1987) discussan interestingexperiment in Illinois. New claimants
were randomly assigned into three groups of about 5,000 each. One group
was o¤ered a voucher worth $500 that they would receive if they found a
job within 11 weeks. For the second group the $500 voucher could be re-
deemed by the employer. The third group was the control group. Woodbury
and Spiegelman found small but signi…cant e¤ects from the employee-based
subsidy, but no signi…cant e¤ects from the employer based subsidy. The
participation of employees and employers in the latter scheme was partic-
ularly low (only about 3 percent of the sample claimed employer bonuses).
This could be due to administration costs of red tape, but it could also be
because of stigma e¤ects - skilled workers were much less likely to refuse to
participate in the scheme. Dubin and Rivers (1993) argue that one accounts
for self-selection wage subsidies can have a more substantial e¤ect. Burt-
less (1985) describes an experiment in Dayton, Ohio in 1980-81 where some
51welfare recipients were given vouchers which employers could redeem and
another randomly assigned group were given nothing. The treatment group
actually fared worse than the control. Holonbeck and Willke (1991) report a
similarly negative result from a Wisconsin randomised experiment for partic-
ularly disadvantaged groups. Again, because these groups were particularly
disadvantaged it is likely that stigma e¤ects are important in explaining the
…ndings.
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